Natural Gas: Make or Break National Policy Issue

Natural gas policy decisions in the next 30 years could make or break nations. They will be critical in the long-term health of the economy, a country’s geopolitical partners, and its energy security. Many developed countries are focused on moving as fast as they can toward renewable-energy sources and ignoring the risks of making this humongous bet on relatively unproven technology. Developing countries aren’t likely to move rapidly toward renewable sources, and will likely take advantage of the plentiful, low-cost natural gas that will be available for the foreseeable future. Progress toward having substantially more renewable-energy sources might be better achieved and faster if natural gas were the essential partner in every country’s energy strategy. Natural gas could be the great enabler: It could enable renewables to be developed more effectively; it could enable energy security for countries making the transition away from coal; it could enable a robust and resilient national economy in the next fifty years; and it could enable faster progress toward reducing climate-change emissions.

RECENT SIGNALS OF CHANGE

The new availability of low-cost natural gas has dramatically altered the economics of energy production and the strategies for combating global carbon emissions around the world.

  • Gas is turning into a better opportunity than oil for many producers. The technology of shale oil production continues to advance steadily in spite of or perhaps because of low hydrocarbon prices. Over the last five years, production well productivity has risen more than 400%, 40% in the last year. US exports of natural gas have just exceeded US gas imports for the first time in 60 years with most of the export increases going to Mexico and Canada. From 2000 to 2015, the percentage of total energy production of natural gas in Shell, Eni, Total, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron went up significantly. Only in BP did it go down slightly. In Shell, Eni, and Total the share of natural gas is almost 50 percent.
  • New environmental risks from natural gas operations are coming to light. Recent figures indicate that around a third of the annual methane emissions in the United States can be traced to the natural gas industry. While methane doesn’t remain in the atmosphere as long as carbon dioxide (12 years compared to 500 years), it is about 25 times more potent as a cause of global warming. The Environmental Defense Fund, an American NGO that often works with industry, estimates 2-2.5% of the gas flowing trough the supply chain leaks out.
  • Global oil supply has steadily risen—almost 20 percent—since the year 2000 to over 95 million b/d in 2016, with non-OPEC producers leading the charge, competing strongly with OPEC producers for market share. In 1995, proven oil reserves (i.e., oil discovered and economic to produce) in the world were 120 trillion cubic meters. In 2015, proven oil reserves were 187 trn cubic meters.

Shipping of natural gas is rapidly becoming global, not local.

  • A single global market for natural gas is emerging. Natural gas is starting to be bought and sold around the world just like oil and petrochemicals. Behind this revolution is improved technology for moving gas as a liquid, flexible contracts, and new global capacity for sending and receiving LNG shipments. The share of gas moving by sea reached 40 percent of total trades in 2015 and according to the IEA will account for a bigger share of trading than pipelines by 2040. Thirty-nine countries now import LNG compared to 17 ten years ago.
  • Qatar is the world’s largest supplier of LNG with a market share of nearly one-third. In 2016, Qatar shipped 77.2 million metric tons (mmt) for 30.0 percent share and Australia shipped 44.3 mmt for a 17.2 percent share. Australia is expected to overtake Qatar based on current development plans in 2019 with at least 80 mmt. Ironically, Adelaide, Australia, suffered recent power blackouts during a nationwide heat wave because lack of investment in the country’s natural-gas infrastructure. The next big exporters were Malaysia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Algeria, Russia, Trinidad, and Oman.
  • The world’s seas are becoming more efficient in moving natural gas. The major Panama Canal expansion, opened in June 2016, more than doubles the canal’s capacity and includes a third lane to accommodate ships large enough to carry 14,000 TEU. A key market of the future for the canal could be LNG carrier traffic. Also, Russia’s US$27 billion Yamal LNG project within the Arctic Circle will begin operation in 2017. This remarkable project will use West-designed and Far East-built ice-class LNG tankers to enable year-round export shipments from northwest Siberia to European and Asian markets. The LNG tankers are intended for navigation both westbound and eastbound along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Arctic seaway along Russia’s coast linking the Atlantic and Pacific. The Russian company, Novatek, has a 50.1% interest in Yamal LNG; China National Petroleum Corporation and France’s Total Group both have a 20% holding; and the Chinese state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 9.1% interest.

China and India are reshaping their energy supply and demand mix and their foreign trade in energy commodities. China is proceeding faster than India.

  • In 2000 China and India didn’t have any LNG imports. In 2016 they are the third and fourth largest importers after Japan and South Korea. The United States and China are currently negotiating a trade deal that could involve US LNG shipments to China.
  • China Petroleum & Chemical, or Sinopec, is attempting to double domestic natural gas production in the next five years by rapidly expanding natural gas production from shale reserves in order to reduce coal usage in the country and reduce China’s need for imported liquefied natural gas. Many investors around the world were counting on sending natural gas to China.
  • Asia accounts for two thirds of the world’s coal demand, but that demand may be falling and sooner than everyone’s base-case scenarios show. In China in 2016, coal consumption fell 4.7 percent. This was the third year in a row of declining use. Coal currently supplies about 70 percent of China’s electricity, but the Chinese government is focused on cutting coal’s use, and succeeding. Coal-fired plant capacity in China is still being added—in November 2016, China’s National Energy Administration announced it is raising coal-fired power capacity as much as 20 percent by 2020, from 900 gigawatts in 2015 to as much as 1,100 gigawatts by 2020—but capacity utilization of coal plants has fallen steadily in China from around 60 percent in 2010 to around 50 percent in 2016. It appears coal will only provide 55 percent of China’s electricity mix in 2020.
  • Coal makes up 61 percent of India’s power-generating capacity, but India has announced it doesn’t need any new coal-fired power stations in the next decade beyond what it is currently building. Capacity utilization of coal plants has fallen steadily in India from over 75 percent in 2010 to less than 60 percent in 2016. Even with the rapid economic growth of the last decade, about 40 percent of India’s coal-fired power plants are now idle because of weaknesses in the distribution system and because government planners overestimated the growth in demand.

US electricity generation from natural gas now exceeds that from coal.

  • In 2016, natural gas’s share of US electricity generation at 33 percent exceeded coal’s share at 32 percent for the first time. Coal’s share has steadily fallen from a high of over 55 percent in the mid-1980s, while natural gas’ share has steadily risen from about 10 percent then. Nuclear remains steady at 19 percent, while renewables, not counting hydro, have risen from zero in the mid-1980s to 8 percent in 2016.
  • The Tennessee Valley Authority historically has been a major user of coal plants, but that has changed radically since 2007 because of environmental agreements to reduce coal emissions, the lower prices of natural gas, and increased production from nuclear. In 2007, over 55 percent of TVA’s energy mix was coal; in 2017 a little over 20 percent of the mix will be coal. Since 2011, TVA has shut down 24 coal-fired units out of 59 in its network.

LNG supplies are changing some countries’ dependence on pipeline gas that comes from other countries, that runs through unfriendly countries, or both. Poland’s new LNG import terminal reduces its reliance on gas from Russia.

In developed countries, wind and solar renewables are beginning to change radically the energy supply mix.

  • In 2015 5.5 percent of the world’s electricity came from wind and solar. Hydropower, wind, and solar together produced 9.4 percent of the electricity. The International Energy Agency said in July 2017 that for the first time the amount of renewable capacity commissioned in 2016 almost matched that for other sources of power generation, such as coal and natural gas. In some countries, solar photovoltaics are cheaper than coal and gas.
  • An interesting example of where wind and solar renewables are becoming a significant energy source is Texas, the center of the US oil and gas industry. In 2001, renewables (wind, solar, and hydro) accounted for 2% of Texas energy; in 2016 they will accounted for 16%. One night this past winter, nearly 50% of the power flowing into the Texas grid came from wind turbines in the state. Federal subsidies for Texas renewables have been a big factor, but equally big have been the falling costs of solar and wind technology.

 The electricity system around the world is fundamentally changing because of the orchestrated growth in the use of renewables largely with subsidies. The costs of these subsidies were modest when the renewables contribution to overall energy supply was marginal, but that’s changing. Since 2008, public subsidies for renewables have been $800 billion. In 2014, the IEA estimated that decarbonizing the global electricity grid will require $20 trillion in investment in the next 20 years, and that still leaves much to be done. A new economic system for electricity is required, but the ecosystem of energy and the economy is too complex for anyone to know what that should be and how to make the changeover efficiently. Source: The Economist, “A world turned upside down,” February 25, 2017, pp. 18-20. Other risks of investing in renewables include the new technology uncertainty and costs, and the many, many land-use, energy, and environmental regulations in place that are just as big hurdles for renewables as they are for the other energy supply investments.

Nuclear energy plants are progressing in many parts of the world, but not in the United States and Germany. Electricity from US nuclear plants at about 1.5 mega-watt hours per year is expected to decline very slowly over the next 25 years as reactors close and aren’t replaced. Toshiba’s subsidiary, Westinghouse, recently declared bankruptcy over escalating costs involving billions of dollars to finish two nuclear power plants in South Carolina and Georgia. Both plants might not be completed. 

The International Energy Agency (IEA) report on CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion highlighted that the growth in global CO2 emissions was slowing down. In 2014, the IEA indicated the global CO2 emissions were 32.4 gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2), an increase of 0.8 percent over 2013 levels. The growth in 2013 over 2012 levels was 1.7 percent, while the average annual growth rate since 2000 has been 2.4 percent. Work by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that holding warming to 2°C typically requires global annual emissions to peak sharply around 2020, fall steeply by 50% before 2040, and be close to net zero towards the end of the century. The EIA’s International Energy Outlook 2016 reference case has global energy-related CO2 emissions growing about 1 percent/year from 2012 to 2040, but will CO2 emissions peak much sooner than anyone expected? 

Governments around the world are already adopting major plans to transition to renewable energy in spite of major uncertainties about the costs and plausibility of those plans. In a June 2017 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 21 energy researchers rejected in no uncertain terms Stanford Professor Mark Jacobson’s 2015 study that made a case for 100 percent renewable energy by 2050. They wrote Jacobson’s plan “can, at best, be described as a poorly executed exploration of an interesting hypothesis. The study’s numerous shortcomings and errors render it unreliable as a guide about the likely cost, technical reliability, or feasibility of a 100 percent wind, solar, and hydroelectric power system.” In other words, it was crap. The problem is that governments around the world— Germany, California, and Portland, Oregon—are already implementing extensive plans to transition to renewable energy. Germany’s goal is 80 percent renewable by 2050; California is trying to set a goal of 60 percent by 2030; Portland wants to be using 100 percent clean power by 2035. 

Even if oil demand peaks in the foreseeable future and the world achieves a net-zero emissions state, oil and natural gas will continue to be key energy sources. Shell’s scenario group in May 2016 highlighted that for the future global population of 10 billion people to have a decent quality of life, the global energy needs would have to double by the end of the century. Oil and natural gas would have to remain important energy sources for the next forty years, until solar, wind, and nuclear sources can assume the burden of meeting the global economy’s needs. If the net-zero emissions state is reached, let’s say by the end of the century, the share of oil and gas in the overall energy mix will have fallen from 57 percent to around 15 percent, while the non-fossil-fuel share would be just under 80 percent. 

ORACLE MUSINGS ABOUT ENERGY, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY OUTCOMES

Depending on what natural gas policy decisions are made, world economic, political, security, and environmental outcomes in the next twenty years could be very different.

For the next 20 years the demand for natural gas is likely to explode.

  • Natural gas production could grow even more than base case scenarios because of technology innovation, rapid development of LNG shipping infrastructure, new government restrictions around the world on use of coal in power generation, and high costs of clean coal technology.
  • Technology innovation will likely continue to lower the costs of shale gas development. China and Argentina could see rapid expansion in their natural gas productions.
  • Global shipments of LNG will expand rapidly as more infrastructure for receiving LNG is built in countries around the world. Since most of the shipments will be headed toward Asia, issues around the security of shipping lanes in Asian waters will develop.
  • Russia leverage will both increase and decrease because of natural gas. Many traditional buyers of Russia’s gas will strive to reduce their dependence on Russian piped gas by investing in LNG. At the same time, Russia will be able to serve the new LNG markets.

Future of coal: Global coal demand could begin to fall soon.

  • The momentum to substitute natural gas for coal in electricity generation will likely accelerate.
  • Coal use will likely continue to decline in the United States. It’s uncertain how Trump administration policies could affect that decline, but in general the trend won’t likely reverse.
  • The biggest changes in coal usage could be in China and India. If natural gas prices remain low, coal demand will most likely keep falling. In fact, China and India could struggle to keep up with the forces driving those declines.
  • Clean coal technologies will likely struggle to become commercial. Consequently, in a couple of years, new coal plants may never be built again in a large industrial economy.

The biggest economic winners of using more natural gas could be the rapidly growing Asian economies, particularly China.

  • Natural gas supplies could help meet the extensive energy growth needs throughout Asia, and enable Asian countries to move faster away from coal.
  • China companies will likely continue to be industrial leaders in all commodities, including oil, gas, and coal. The Chinese companies will continue to be the biggest, invest the most money, and generally be aggressive to capture the most market share.
  • China could bet big on natural gas for its economy. It could expedite LNG receiving facilities and new natural gas burning power plants.
  • China’s changing policies toward improving the country’s air quality and energy supply in the next ten years could have the greatest impact on global CO2 emissions and the world’s goal of reaching a net zero CO2 emissions state as soon as possible.
  • China will likely ride the wave of coal use reduction and assume a much large leadership role on environmental issues in international forums, like the IPCC.
  • In many respects, India’s accomplishments will be greater, but they will follow China’s.

National energy plans in developed economies may not fit with reality.

  • Germany and California and others focused on making a complete transition to renewable sources as fast as possible could struggle with their goals. Physical and financial barriers could be too large to reach 50 percent of power from renewable sources. Disruptions in power services could increase. The goals will likely stay in place, but the old energy systems could remain critical.
  • Nuclear power could gain more advocates and expand, but not likely unless major problems with renewables appear.

Renewable power could expand more rapidly than projected in rapidly developing economies.

  • For many countries, in ten years more than 50 percent of new power capacity will be from renewables sources. Major investments in infrastructure for using more renewable technologies will be made.
  • Chinese corporations will likely continue to invest heavily toward becoming global leaders in renewable-energy technologies, like solar electricity generation and electric cars.
  • If net CO2 emissions per year start falling, societies could struggle to maintain their commitments toward renewables.

The battles over the development and use of fossil fuels could become even more intense.

  • Greenhouse gas emissions will likely continue to accumulate in the atmosphere and ocean for the foreseeable future. CO2 emissions from gas will continue to grow because of the growth in natural gas production.
  • NGO’s will likely continue to object to natural gas and oil development and production activities and the companies that conduct them.
  • Gas companies are unlikely ever to be viewed as good world citizens.
  • Large private oil and gas companies could experience more protests wherever they operate.
  • Russian and Chinese companies will likely be singled out more and more by NGOs.

New economic system for electricity will emerge over the next 15 years: But no one can predict the dynamics of that system because there are too many uncertainties in technology, geopolitics, human behavior, climate change, energy supply sources, energy demand, and economics. The wide range of possible outcomes include:

  • A very unreliable electricity delivery system, with major disruptions, could develop in major industrial economies, particularly those with the biggest commitments toward renewables.
  • On the other hand, an integrated system of diverse power sources with higher electricity prices could develop that is much more efficient and robust than current systems.

 

Peak Coal Demand? Followed by Peak CO2 Emissions?

ORACLE’S RESPONSE

Global coal demand could peak much sooner than what the major reference scenarios of the US Energy Information Administration and International Energy Agency currently show. China’s and India’s changed outlooks for coal demand would be the biggest factor in demand peaking sooner, driven by China’s clean air concerns, falling energy intensity of economic growth in China and India, and rapidly expanding supplies of natural gas around the world. If that’s the case, it’s plausible CO2 emissions could also peak in the next 10 years. Increased momentum will develop for the policies that contributed to reaching this tipping point. A new economic system for electricity will emerge in the next 15 years, but no one can predict what the dynamics of that system will be because of the uncertainties. China and India could emerge as the global leaders on energy and the environment if they’re able to achieve economic success without the energy intensity required by OECD countries.

RECENT SIGNALS OF CHANGE

Demand for electricity in Asia is surprising stagnant and this is affecting coal demand. Apparently, the falling energy intensity of economic growth wasn’t taken into account very well.

  • Asia accounts for two thirds of the world’s coal demand, but that demand may be falling and sooner than everyone’s base-case scenarios show. In China in 2016, coal consumption fell 4.7 percent. This was the third year in a row of declining use. Coal currently supplies about 70 percent of China’s electricity, but the Chinese government is focused on cutting coal’s use, and succeeding. Coal-fired plant capacity in China is still being added—in November 2016, China’s National Energy Administration announced it is raising coal-fired power capacity as much as 20 percent by 2020, from 900 gigawatts in 2015 to as much as 1,100 gigawatts by 2020—but capacity utilization of coal plants has fallen steadily in China from around 60 percent in 2010 to around 50 percent in 2016. It appears coal will only provide 55 percent of China’s electricity mix in 2020.
  • Primary energy demand in China declined in 2015, the first fall in 20 years. Despite recent years of little or no growth in demand for power in China, the government is forecasting growth of between 3.8 percent and 4.6 percent by 2020. China continues to dominate major industries that use a lot of electricity, but environmental problems from heavy manufacturing are influencing national government policies. China’s aluminum production accounts for more than 50 percent of world production. China’s production grew 60 percent from 2011 to 2016, reaching 31 million tons in 2016. Aluminum production is an energy-intensive process and China’s aluminum smelters receive 90 percent of their power from coal. In the world steel industry with global oversupply, China, the world’s number one steel producer, has been producing steel at a record pace.
  • Coal makes up 61 percent of India’s power-generating capacity, but India has announced it doesn’t need any new coal-fired power stations in the next decade beyond what it is currently building. Capacity utilization of coal plants has fallen steadily in India from over 75 percent in 2010 to less than 60 percent in 2016. Even with the rapid economic growth of the last decade, about 40 percent of India’s coal-fired power plants are now idle because of weaknesses in the distribution system and because government planners overestimated the growth in demand.

The coal reference case in US Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) International Energy Outlook 2016 has world coal consumption increasing from 2012 to 2040 at an average rate of 0.6 percent/year. Much of that increase is from India. What if China’s coal consumption is peaking now and not in 2025? And what if India’s large increase in demand for coal over the next 25 years doesn’t materialize?

Plenty of oil and gas is around and few limitations to producing more.

  • Global oil supply has steadily risen—almost 20 percent—since the year 2000 to over 95 million b/d in 2016, with non-OPEC producers leading the charge, competing strongly with OPEC producers for market share. In 1995, proven oil reserves (i.e., oil discovered and economic to produce) in the world were 120 trillion cubic meters. In 2015, proven oil reserves were 187 trn cubic meters.
  • Fueled by commodity prices, particularly oil exports, sovereign-wealth funds—financial vehicles owned by governments—doubled in size from 2007 to 2015 to $7.2 trillion. Since 2007, the number of sovereign funds increased by 44 percent to 79, many in Africa and Asia. Nearly 60 percent of sovereign wealth fund assets are related to energy exports. Many sovereign-wealth funds, including most likely several from the Middle-Eastern oil exporters, came to the aid of the Russian Direct Investment Fund when US and European sanctions restricted business between the Russian fund and Western companies.
  • Developing economies account for 43 percent of global GDP but 65 percent of crony wealth. Crony capitalism is where an individual’s wealth stems from a special relationship with the government. Since globalization took off in the 1990s, the wealth of billionaires in high-crony industries, like natural resources, real estate, construction, telecoms, and defense where there’s a lot of interaction with the state or are licensed by it, grew substantially in developing countries. Russia’s crony industries represents approximately 18 percent of Russia’s GDP.
  • The world’s seas are becoming more efficient in moving hydrocarbons. The major Panama Canal expansion, opened in June 2016, more than doubles the canal’s capacity and includes a third lane to accommodate ships large enough to carry 14,000 TEU. A key market of the future for the canal could be LNG carrier traffic. Also, Russia’s US$27 billion Yamal LNG project within the Arctic Circle will begin operation in 2017. This remarkable project will use West-designed and Far East-built ice-class LNG tankers to enable year-round export shipments from northwest Siberia to European and Asian markets. The LNG tankers are intended for navigation both westbound and eastbound along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Arctic seaway along Russia’s coast linking the Atlantic and Pacific. The Russian company, Novatek, has a 50.1% interest in Yamal LNG; China National Petroleum Corporation and France’s Total Group both have a 20% holding; and the Chinese state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 9.1% interest.
  • Gas is turning into a better opportunity than oil for producers. The technology of shale oil production is rapidly advancing despite current cost constraints. Over the last five years, production well productivity has risen more than 400%, 40% in the last year. US exports of natural gas have just exceeded US gas imports for the first time in 60 years with most of the export increases going to Mexico and Canada. From 2000 to 2015, the percentage of total energy production of natural gas in Shell, Eni, Total, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron went up significantly. Only in BP did it go down slightly. In Shell, Eni, and Total the share of natural gas is almost 50 percent.
  • However, new environmental risks from natural gas operations are coming to light. Recent figures indicate that around a third of the annual methane emissions in the United States can be traced to the natural gas industry. While methane doesn’t remain in the atmosphere as long as carbon dioxide (12 years compared to 500 years), it is about 25 times more potent as a cause of global warming. The Environmental Defense Fund, an American NGO that often works with industry, estimates 2-2.5% of the gas flowing trough the supply chain leaks out.

In developed countries, wind and solar renewables are contributing to the changing the energy supply mix. Will this momentum change with lower hydrocarbon prices? A key signal is that wind and solar renewables are becoming a significant energy source in Texas, the center of the US oil and gas industry. In 2001, renewables (wind, solar, and hydro) accounted for 2% of Texas energy; in 2016 they will account for 16%. One night this past winter, nearly 50% of the power flowing into the Texas grid came from wind turbines in the state. Federal subsidies for renewables have been a big factor, but equally big have been the falling costs of solar and wind technology.

With renewables expected to account for half of the growth in global energy supply over the next 20 years, the costs of the changeover will be huge. The electricity system around the world is fundamentally changing because of the orchestrated growth in the use of renewables largely with subsidies. The costs of these subsidies were modest when the renewables contribution to overall energy supply was marginal, but that’s changing. Since 2008, public subsidies for renewables have been $800 billion. In 2014, the IEA estimated that decarbonizing the global electricity grid will require $20 trillion in investment in the next 20 years, and that still leaves much to be done. A new economic system for electricity is required, but the ecosystem of energy and the economy is too complex for anyone to know what that should be and how to make the changeover efficiently. Source: The Economist, “A world turned upside down,” February 25, 2017, pp. 18-20.

US electricity generation from coal shrank from its peak in 2008 at slightly more than 2 billion megawatt-hours to about 1.3 billion mega-watt hours in 2016.

  • In 2016, natural gas’s share of US electricity generation at 33 percent exceeded coal’s share at 32 percent for the first time. Coal’s share has steadily fallen from a high of over 55 percent in the mid-1980s, while natural gas’ share has steadily risen from about 10 percent then. Nuclear remains steady at 19 percent, while renewables, not counting hydro, have risen from zero in the mid-1980s to 8 percent in 2016.
  • The Tennessee Valley Authority historically has been a major user of coal plants, but that has changed radically since 2007 because of environmental agreements to reduce coal emissions, the lower prices of natural gas, and increased production from nuclear. In 2007, over 55 percent of TVA’s energy mix was coal; in 2017 a little over 20 percent of the mix will be coal. Since 2011, TVA has shut down 24 coal-fired units out of 59 in its network.

Clean coal technologies are not economic yet, and maybe never will be. Southern Co. also announced in February 2017 that the first of its kind “clean coal” power plant is almost complete, but that it won’t be economic to operate the plant competing against natural gas power plants using today’s low gas prices. The new coal plant that will be able to burn coal and capture the carbon-dioxide output has taken 7 years to complete and cost $7.1 billion to build. If Southern had built a natural-gas power plant of comparable size, it would have cost about $700 million to build—one-tenth the cost of the clean coal plant.

Given all the changes and uncertainties, the world’s oil expert forecasters can’t agree on whether oil demand growth will peak in the next 30 years or not. Just another indication of how uncertain is the energy picture around the world and the global economy. A major issue that is perhaps already affecting investment decisions in oil companies is the affects of new technologies for fuel efficiency and electric cars and of future carbon rules on oil consumption in the future. The Wall Street Journal published on May 22, 2017 the results of an informal survey of big oil companies and the International Energy Agency on when they expect global demand for oil to peak. BP and Exxon Mobil don’t foresee a peak in the near future, while BP thought it would peak in the 2040s, Royal Dutch Shell 2025-2030 (so soon!), Statoil 2030, Total as soon as 2040, and the IEA after 2040. In May 2016, Shell’s scenario group published a plausible scenario of the world meeting international climate goals and achieving a net-zero emissions state. Shell described a number of key developments over the next 50 years that could lead to net-zero emissions, including significant investments in solar, wind, and nuclear sources, carbon capture and storage technologies, many country de-carbonization strategies, and a global carbon pricing system—whether through carbon trading, carbon taxes, or mandated carbon-emission standards.

Even if oil demand peaks in the foreseeable future and the world achieves a net-zero emissions state, oil and natural gas will continue to be key energy sources. Shell’s scenario group in May 2016 highlighted that for the future global population of 10 billion people to have a decent quality of life, the global energy needs would have to double by the end of the century. Oil and natural gas would have to remain important energy sources for the next forty years, until solar, wind, and nuclear sources can assume the burden of meeting the global economy’s needs. If the net-zero emissions state is reached, let’s say by the end of the century, the share of oil and gas in the overall energy mix will have fallen from 57 percent to around 15 percent, while the non-fossil-fuel share would be just under 80 percent.

China is rapidly reshaping its energy supply and demand mix and its foreign trade in energy commodities.

  • US coal exports to China have recently shrunk to almost nothing. They were almost 6 million short tons in 2011, 10 million tons in 2013, and less than 1 million in 2016. Out of seven West Coast export terminals proposed in the past five years, none has opened.
  • In January 2017, Mongolia announced a new deal to sell coal to China. With Chinese coal production falling rapidly because of China-government environmental concerns, the deal effectively transfers China’s pollution to Mongolia. Trucks carrying coal are backed up for nearly 40 miles at Mongolia’s southern border with China. Observers call it the world’s largest traffic jam.
  • North Korea’s economy is heavily dependent on China’s purchase of North Korean coal and China’s supply of oil. China is essentially the only importer of North Korean coal. New UN sanctions toward North Korea because of nuclear-weapons development activities have limited North Korean coal exports to China. China has recently supported those sanctions.
  • China Petroleum & Chemical, or Sinopec, is attempting to double domestic natural gas production in the next five years by rapidly expanding natural gas production from shale reserves in order to reduce coal usage in the country and reduce China’s need for imported liquefied natural gas. Many investors around the world were counting on sending natural gas to China.

Nuclear energy plants are progressing in many parts of the world, but not in the United States and Germany. Electricity from US nuclear plants at about 1.5 mega-watt hours per year is expected to decline very slowly over the next 25 years. Toshiba’s subsidiary, Westinghouse, recently declared bankruptcy over escalating costs involving billions of dollars to finish Southern Co.’s Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, the first new nuclear plant in the United States in three decades.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) report on CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion highlighted that the growth in global CO2 emissions was slowing down. In 2014, the IEA indicated the global CO2 emissions were 32.4 gigatons of carbon dioxide (GtCO2), an increase of 0.8 percent over 2013 levels. The growth in 2013 over 2012 levels was 1.7 percent, while the average annual growth rate since 2000 has been 2.4 percent. Work by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that holding warming to 2°C typically requires global annual emissions to peak sharply around 2020, fall steeply by 50% before 2040, and be close to net zero towards the end of the century. The EIA’s International Energy Outlook 2016 reference case has global energy-related CO2 emissions growing about 1 percent/year from 2012 to 2040, but will CO2 emissions peak much sooner than anyone expected?

CO2 emissions aren’t the only environmental issue of coal. An immediate problem—in developing countries in particular—is particulate emissions. China’s government is actively tackling smog created by burning coal. New instructions were issued in February 2017. These may have a greater impact than previous instructions that are sometimes ignored by local authorities. The concentration of fine particles, or PM2.5, in Beijing’s air—about 65 micrograms per cubic meter in 2016—still exceeds the World Health Organization’s recommended limit of 25 micrograms per cubic meter. Beijing’s fine particulate level is getting better—it was over 100 micrograms per cubic meter in 2013, but still more than double the recommended limit.

ORACLE MUSINGS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF COAL AND CO2 EMISSIONS

Global Energy Mix. For the next 20 years, the range of uncertainty on the energy sources used in the world will remain extremely wide. The use of nuclear, the government restrictions on hydrocarbons, the technology innovations in renewables, natural gas development, and clean carbon, etc. all remain uncertain. Still it’s very plausible:

  • Nuclear power will gain more advocates and expand.
  • Oil demand will remain high because consumers in both developing and developed countries will continue to prefer internal-combustion-engine cars and trucks over alternative-fueled vehicles.
  • Renewable power will expand more rapidly than projected in non-OECD countries. For many countries, in ten years more than 50 percent of new power capacity will be from renewables sources. Major investments in infrastructure for using more renewable technologies will be made.

While the demand for oil will increase for the next 20 years, the demand for natural gas is going to explode.

  • Natural gas production could grow even more than base case scenarios because of technology innovation, a raft of new government restrictions around the world on use of coal in power generation, and high costs of clean coal technology.
  • Technology innovation will likely continue to lower the costs of shale gas development. China and Argentina will see rapid expansion in their natural gas productions.
  • The two big hurdles for companies developing the new oil and gas reserves will be the large capital required to explore, develop, and produce oil and gas in hard to reach places, and the liability risk to companies from oil spills and contributing to global warming.

Future of coal: Global coal demand could begin to fall soon.

  • The momentum to substitute natural gas for coal in electricity generation will likely accelerate.
  • Coal use will continue to decline in the United States. It’s uncertain how Trump administration policies could affect that decline, but in general the trend won’t likely reverse.
  • The biggest changes in coal usage will be in China and India. As long as natural gas prices remain low, coal demand will most likely keep falling significantly. In fact, China and India will struggle to keep up with the forces driving those declines.
  • Clean coal technologies will struggle to become commercial. Few new coal plants will be built, but retrofitting old facilities with expensive clean coal capabilities is not likely going to happen.

CO2 tipping-point. Global annual CO2 emissions may be peaking and could start to fall, perhaps even sharply, from 2020 to 2030. Momentum will increase to continue the policies that led to more efficient energy usage in the economy, the expansion of nuclear, the substitution of natural gas for coal in electricity generation, etc.

China’s Leadership on Energy and the Environment

  • China’s changing policies toward improving the country’s air quality and energy supply in the next ten years will have the greatest impact on global CO2 emissions and the world’s goal of reaching a net zero CO2 emissions state as soon as possible.
  • China will ride the wave of coal use reduction and expand its commitments toward global environmental goals. China will assume a much large leadership role on environmental issues in international forums, like the IPCC.
  • Chinese corporations will continue to invest heavily toward becoming global leaders in renewable-energy technologies, like solar electricity generation and electric cars.
  • China companies will be the industrial leaders around the world in all commodities, including oil, gas, and coal. The Chinese companies will be the biggest, invest the most money, and generally be aggressive to capture the most market share.
  • The Chinese government will likely support Chinese companies moving abroad with various means of support to help them penetrate foreign markets and avoid trade and tariff costs.
  • In general, transparency of commercial transactions between governments and commodity producers will go down worldwide; corruption levels could increase.
  • In many respects, India’s accomplishments will be greater, but they will follow China’s.

The battles over the development and use of fossil fuels could become even more intense.

  • Greenhouse gas emissions will continue to accumulate in the atmosphere and ocean for the foreseeable future. CO2 emissions from gas will continue to grow because of the growth in natural gas production.
  • NGO’s will continue to object to natural gas and oil development and production activities and the companies that conduct them.
  • Gas companies will never be viewed as good world citizens.
  • Large private oil and gas companies could experience more protests wherever they operate.
  • Russian and Chinese companies will be singled out more and more by NGOs.
  • Many western governments will find themselves simultaneously penalizing and sanctioning Russian and Chinese companies involved in oil and gas operations.

New economic system for electricity will emerge over the next 15 years: But no one can predict the dynamics of that system because there are too many uncertainties in technology, geopolitics, human behavior, climate change, energy supply sources, energy demand, and economics.

  • Major disruptions in energy supply could occur.
  • No one can predict what the costs of energy and environmental protection will be. The range of possible outcomes is very wide.
  • If CO2 emissions peak, societies will likely place a higher priority on lower costs and more robust economies than on less chance of significant climate change and higher costs.

Energy Industry and the Governments that Depend on It

  • A restructuring of the global energy industry is underway.
  • Renewable energy will be at the center of the industry, but fossil fuels will still be essential for the global economy.
  • The players will change quite a bit, and power will shift to developing-country producers, both state-owned and private ones.
  • Sovereign-wealth funds will continue to accumulate wealth and power.

 

Have Oil and Gas Companies Seen Their Best Days?

ORACLE’S RESPONSE:

No. The actions of large oil and gas companies will continue to shape the global economy for the foreseeable future. Despite efforts around the world to diversify away from hydrocarbons, state-owned oil and gas companies and large independent producers will grow and prosper, and be critical players in efforts to move toward a net-zero emissions regime. If you’re a pension fund, buy stocks of the major oil and gas producers, including those from China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia (after Aramco’s IPO).

RECENT SIGNALS OF CHANGE

Oil and natural gas will continue to be key energy sources for the foreseeable future. In May 2016, Shell’s scenario group published a plausible scenario of the world meeting international climate goals and achieving a net-zero emissions state. Shell described a number of key developments over the next 50 years that could lead to net-zero emissions, including significant investments in solar, wind, and nuclear sources, carbon capture and storage technologies, many country de-carbonization strategies, and a global carbon pricing system—whether through carbon trading, carbon taxes, or mandated carbon-emission standards. However, for the future global population of 10 billion people to have a decent quality of life, the global energy needs would have to double by the end of the century. Oil and natural gas would have to remain important energy sources for the next forty years, until solar, wind, and nuclear sources can assume the burden of meeting the global economy’s needs. When the net-zero emissions state reached, let’s say by the end of the century, the share of oil and gas in the overall energy mix will have fallen from 57 percent to around 15 percent, while the non-fossil-fuel share will be just under 80 percent.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), to have a chance at keeping global warming to less than 2ºC above pre-industrial levels, oil demand would have to peak in 2020 at 93 million barrels per day (b/d), just above current levels, and oil use in passenger transport would have to decrease dramatically. Shell’s chief financial officer said he expected oil demand could peak in 5 to 15 years. State-owned China National Petroleum Corp. recently forecast that China’s oil consumption would begin to decline by 2030. But the uncertainty is high on when demand might peak. It could be much later. In its most likely scenario, where more stringent government policies to limit global warming aren’t effectively implemented, the IEA says oil demand will continue to increase beyond 2030.

There is plenty of oil and gas. In 1995, proven oil reserves (i.e., oil discovered and economic to produce) in the world were 120 trillion cubic meters. In 2015, proven oil reserves were 187 trn cubic meters. Global oil supply has steadily risen—almost 20 percent—since the year 2000 to over 95 million b/d in 2016, with non-OPEC producers leading the charge, competing strongly with OPEC producers for market share.

The last three years have been tough on OPEC countries that rely on oil and gas revenues for their government budgets. The International Monetary Fund in October 2016 estimated the oil price needed to balance Middle Eastern government budgets ranged from a low of $47.76/b for Kuwait to a high of $216.46 for Libya. The prices are a key indicator of the governments’ dependency on oil revenues and the budget difficulties they face when prices fall. Surprisingly, Iran at $55.29/b is perhaps less motivated than Saudi Arabia at $79.71/b for a large price increase. In 2015, Saudi Arabia posted a budget deficit of $98 billion. In October 2016, the Kingdom issued $17.5 billion of bonds, its largest amount ever. Governments facing years of economic difficulties are struggling with how much effort should they apply to save existing ventures (and the jobs), mitigate the impacts of the closed or canceled ventures, and change the incentives to attract new multinational and local investments.

Government incentives and hurdles toward increased oil and gas development activities vary significantly around the world.

  • Government stakeholders in the United States are questioning the companies’ financial and accounting practices, business models, and oil-spill and climate-change prevention efforts. The US Securities and Exchange Commission is looking into whether ExxonMobil values its unproduced-reserves appropriately after the oil price declines and potential regulatory action on climate change.
  • The US Energy Department recently curtailed licensing and development plans for Alaska’s Arctic region. The US Energy Information Administration in its 2016-published energy outlook shows oil production from Alaska decreasing to less than half its current level after 2030.
  • The governor of the Bank of England suggested in September 2015 the companies should disclose how they would manage climate-change risks.
  • Saudi Aramco, the largest oil producer in the world, is producing oil at record levels.
  • Russia is developing oil reserves as fast as it can under western-government sanctions. Iran is aggressively trying to expand.
  • In November 2016, at the end of China’s President Xi Jinping’s visit to Latin America, China’s state media released its strategic blueprint for China-Latin America relations. Latin America is already China’s second-largest investment destination after Asia. Much of the investment is in energy projects. An example, state-run State Grid Corp. of China, the world’s largest electricity provider by revenue with $312 billion, is pursuing a takeover of CPFL Energia SA, the Brazilian electric company, for $13 billion.

The environmental risks of commodity operations are not going away, and new ones continue to come to light.

  • Recent figures indicate that around a third of the annual methane emissions in the United States can be traced to the natural gas industry. While methane doesn’t remain in the atmosphere as long as carbon dioxide (12 years compared to 500 years), it is about 25 times more potent as a cause of global warming. The Environmental Defense Fund, an American NGO that often works with industry, estimates 2-2.5% of the gas flowing through the supply chain leaks out.
  • Petrobras is implementing a divestment plan to sell $15 billion in assets to help pay off the company’s very high debt load of $126 billion. In the spring and summer of 2016, Petrobras sold stakes in Argentina and Chile subsidiaries, a large offshore oil field to Norway’s Statoil, and petrochemical units to Mexico’s Alpek.

Fueled by commodity prices, particularly oil exports, sovereign-wealth funds—financial vehicles owned by governments—doubled in size from 2007 to 2015 to $7.2 trillion. Since 2007, the number of sovereign funds increased by 44 percent to 79, many in Africa and Asia. Nearly 60 percent of sovereign wealth fund assets are related to energy exports.

Oil prices peaked in August 2013 over $110 a barrel. They bottomed out below $30 a barrel in January 2016. Since May 2016, prices have been relatively level, bouncing around between $40 and $50 a barrel. Not surprisingly, the number of rigs drilling for oil in the United States is up by 50 percent since May.

The world’s seas are becoming more efficient in moving hydrocarbons.

  • The major Panama Canal expansion, opened in June 2016, more than doubles the canal’s capacity and includes a third lane to accommodate ships large enough to carry 14,000 TEU. The Canal hopes to recover the 10 percent to 15 percent of annual revenue lost to the Suez Canal from 2013-2015. A key market of the future for the canal could be LNG carrier traffic.
  • Russia’s US$27 billion Yamal LNG project within the Arctic Circle will begin operation in 2017. This remarkable project will use West-designed and Far East-built ice-class LNG tankers to enable year-round export shipments from northwest Siberia to European and Asian markets. The LNG tankers are intended for navigation both westbound and eastbound along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Arctic seaway along Russia’s coast linking the Atlantic and Pacific. The Russian company, Novatek, has a 50.1% interest in Yamal LNG; China National Petroleum Corporation and France’s Total Group both have a 20% holding; and the Chinese state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 9.1% interest.
  • Ship transport of Russian Barents Sea oil along the Norwegian Arctic coast in the first part of 2016 reached new highs because of cumulative oil-development and port infrastructure investments over the last decade in the Russian sector above the Arctic Circle.

Producers are following the market toward gas. From 2000 to 2015, the percentage of total energy production of natural gas in Shell, Eni, Total, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron went up significantly. Only in BP did it go down slightly. In Shell, Eni, and Total the share of natural gas is almost 50 percent.

  • US exports of natural gas have just exceeded US gas imports for the first time in 60 years with most of the export increases going to Mexico and Canada.
  • China Petroleum & Chemical, or Sinopec, is attempting to double domestic natural gas production in the next five years in order to reduce coal usage in the country and reduce China’s need for imported liquefied natural gas—that many investors around the world were counting on. Sinopec is counting on rapidly expanding natural gas production from shale reserves.
  • US coal exports to China have recently shrunk to almost nothing. They were almost 6 million short tons in 2011, 10 million tons in 2013, and about 300 thousand to date in 2016. Out of seven West Coast export terminals proposed in the past five years, none has opened.

During the last three years of low oil and gas prices, independent oil and gas companies have been reluctant to start new ventures, even to secure low-cost reserves.

  • In 2016 ExxonMobil lost its triple-A bond rating that it has had since 1930. In 2015 it failed to find enough new oil and gas to replace what it produced for the first time in 20 years. And in October 2016 it announced some 4.6 billion barrels of its reserves, nearly 20 percent of its oil and gas reserves, mainly in Canada, may be too expensive to produce.
  • Exxon Mobil is not continuing its involvement in a venture to build a new LNG export terminal in Alaska. The project is not forecast to be very competitive in the world. Just a year ago, the Alaska state government paid $65 million for TransCanada Corp.’s 25% share in the overall project that was expected to cost between $45 billion and $65 billion. BP and ConocoPhillips, other shareholders in the venture, are also expressing concerns about the project.
  • In November 2016 Blackstone Group cancelled an $800 million venture it set up two years before to invest in distressed oil and gas assets in Southeast Asia. Potential sellers such as international oil companies hung onto assets rather than selling on the cheap.

But Russian and Chinese companies have been getting bigger and better while the prices have been low.

  • Russia’s oil and gas companies, Rosneft, Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, and Surgutneftegas—all operating under guidance by Putin’s government—continue to grow and become more capable. Their development and production activities are Russian focused, but the companies have extensive international relationships with technology partners, financiers, service companies, and customers.
  • Russia’s oil and gas ties with both China and India have increased significantly in the last three years. In October 2016, Russia’s state-controlled Rosneft announced the purchase Indian refiner and gas-station owner, Essar Oil, Ltd. for $7.5 billion.
  • Russia also has deals to supply oil and gas to China and for Chinese companies to buy stakes in Russian energy projects abandoned by western firms due to the sanctions. China’s support to Russian energy and infrastructure projects is critical but fragile. For the Yamal LNG project Chinese lenders recently signed a $12 billion loan agreement after two years of talks. But many other agreements signed in the last two years haven’t yet led to firm contracts, and the perception is China has been able to take advantage of Russia’s weak negotiating position. Also, China’s goal of building land and sea routes that will enable Europe to connect more easily with China could reduce Russia’s role as a trading partner of Europe.

As the technological and operational leader in the Arctic region, the partially state-owned Norwegian oil company, Statoil, is continuing to pursue opportunities throughout the region, including in Russia despite the strained political ties between Russia and Norway and the EU. Statoil’s strategic cooperation with Rosneft involves joint exploration in the Russian Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk (in the far east of Russia), as well as pursuing interests in a license in the Norwegian Barents Sea. Statoil began drilling in June 2016 in the Sea of Okhotsk. “We are pleased to have entered a key stage in our long term cooperation with our partner, Statoil . . .,” said Igor Sechin, chief executive of Rosneft and an ally of Russian president Vladimir Putin in July 2016. On the other hand, Norway and Statoil would like to continue selling natural gas extracted from Norwegian waters to Europe. But replacing the aging gas fields in Norway has been difficult, and Statoil and other energy companies haven’t yet made the next big discovery in Norwegian waters that would justify building the large necessary gas export infrastructure.

Some integrated oil and gas companies are also investing in alternatives to oil and gas. Solar and wind energy sources are growing rapidly around the world and their prices now are competitive with fossil-based sources. In a figure by IHS Markit in The Economist November 26, 2016 issue, the cost of power generation in the United States from solar is competitive with oil (although oil isn’t used anymore in power generation). The cost of natural gas is on par with coal. Worldwide, renewable energy passed coal as the world’s biggest source of power-generating capacity. Statoil, Norway’s state-owned energy company, is investing in carbon capture and storage technologies and offshore wind farms.

ORACLE MUSINGS: PLAUSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS WE MIGHT SEE IN THE FUTURE

Large oil and gas companies around the world will do well for the next 20 years largely because demand for oil and gas will continue to increase because the world economy will depend on them. The major uncertainty for all the companies is the policy restrictions on carbon sources that will be implemented. Unless extensive bans on using fossil fuels are implemented, the companies will remain major players in the global economy.

After the next 20 years, the range of uncertainty on the energy sources used in the world remains extremely wide. The use of nuclear, the government restrictions on hydrocarbons, the technology innovations in renewables and CCS, etc. all remain highly uncertain.

While the demand for oil will increase for the next 20 years, the demand for natural gas is going to explode.

  • The two big hurdles for companies developing the new oil and gas reserves will be the large capital required to explore, develop, and produce oil and gas in hard to reach places, and the liability risk to companies from oil spills and contributing to global warming.
  • For oil and gas companies, NGOs, and other energy stakeholders, a key to their success will be their abilities to manage in a complex environment, subject to disruptive changes. Will organizations develop the necessary capabilities, processes, and strategies for an environment of continuous change?

Prices will grow slowly over the next five years.

  • The large, integrated oil and gas producers will specialize in developing low-cost oil and gas reserves anywhere they can be found.
  • They will flock back to Russia when sanctions are lifted.
  • If sanctions aren’t lifted, Russia will get the expertise and financial support it needs from China, India, Brazil, and special deals made with Statoil and others.
  • Africa and North and South America will be major areas of activity.
  • Technology innovation (e.g., in fracking) will continue to lower the costs of extracting oil and gas from source rock.

Greenhouse-gas (CO2 and methane) emissions will likely increase each year and accumulate in the atmosphere and ocean.

  • The battles over the development and use of fossil fuels could become even more intense.
  • NGO’s will continue to object to natural gas development and production activities and the companies that conduct them. Becoming a good world citizen will be hard for gas companies to achieve.
  • Large private oil and gas companies could experience more protests wherever they operate.
  • Russian and Chinese companies will be singled out more and more by NGOs.
  • Many western governments will find themselves simultaneously penalizing Russian and OPEC producers or taxing imports from them while welcoming them as important gas and oil suppliers to their countries.

Most of the large independent oil producers will become majority gas producers. They will follow the various government incentives to increase natural gas production to displace coal and enable a net-zero emissions system. However, the companies will continue to be seen as dirty and dangerous to the environment because of their extensive oil operations and the safety issues associated with the natural gas.

Large western companies will compete well for large projects because of their project experience, use of new technology, and ability to raise large amounts of capital.

  • Chinese companies will become fierce competitors of the large western companies around the world.
  • Russian companies may expand operations outside of Russia.
  • Technology innovation will be extensive in the pursuit of low-cost oil. Many technologies will be valuable in other realms—security, environmental monitoring, automation for underwater and harsh environments, etc.

OPEC Producers are not going to slow down. OPEC producers will not reduce oil production to any degree in order to boost market prices. They might pledge to limit production, but they will continue seeking ways to expand production to meet future demand around the world. Aramco will still produce at high levels.

Sovereign-wealth funds will be more important financiers of oil and gas developments in the future—often the only sources of capital for very large projects.

Oil and gas companies will perform very well financially, and will remain amongst the largest corporations in the world in terms of revenues. But the costs to them of catastrophic environmental events will rise. It’s uncertain how a foreign company, even if it were Chinese, would fare if they were responsible for a major event in the Arctic region that couldn’t be cleaned up.

Arctic by Russian Rules

Many of my blogs will focus on an emerging global issue—in this case the Arctic and Russia’s actions there—and provide insights on  possible developments we might see in the next five years. The blog format will be Foresight Summary, Recent Signals of Change, and Plausible Developments in the Next Five Years.

Foresight Summary

Development of oil and gas resources and other mineral deposits in the Arctic will start increasing again now that commodity prices have started to recover. Confrontations with NGOs and local communities over environmental and social problems in all Arctic countries will begin to increase. Russia will continue to strengthen its dominant Arctic position and as commodity prices rebound will exploit the new economic and political opportunities in the region afforded by Russia’s large search and rescue and security resources in the region, the warming climate, and new technologies for overcoming the hazards of the region. The United States is not building economic and security capabilities in the region and will struggle to influence future outcomes. For the foreseeable future Russia will define the rules and ways in which human activities evolve throughout the region. For Norway, the Arctic will continue to be strategic; Norway will continue to invest in the region, led by Statoil the state-owned oil company, and remain the West’s most active operator and negotiator with Russia in the region. As NATO reinforces its capabilities in Eastern Europe, Russia will exert its presence in the Arctic. While China is not an Arctic nation (with land bordering the Arctic Ocean or above the Arctic Circle), the Chinese government and Chinese companies will increase their presence in Russia, Canada, and Greenland. Specialized shipments of oil, gas, and minerals extracted from Arctic deposits will start flowing regularly along the Russian Arctic coast to Asia countries.

Recent Signals of Change

The key to recognizing new trends, anticipating possible developments in the future, and identifying the strategic implications is to focus on recent signals of change in the world—big, disruptive, out of the ordinary changes—in whatever part of the world, physical or societal, they occur. Recent changes related to the Arctic that indicate new trends or developments may be emerging include:

  • As of July 2016, it appears energy and materials commodity prices hit bottom in 2015 and now are steadily recovering. The commodity fuel (energy) index of indexmundi.com is up approximately 45% since the beginning of 2016, although it’s still 23% down from the highs of a year earlier. Noticeably, private equity firms are beginning again to invest in oil opportunities. The metals price index of indexmundi.com is up 10% for the year, but still down 15% from a year ago.
  • According to NASA, the Earth is getting greener in the rapidly warming northern regions. The amount of leaf area per ground area is increasing as a result of warmer northern temperatures and longer growing seasons. Some unknown amount of greenhouse gases is being pulled out of the atmosphere. It’s probably unlikely this will reduce the Arctic warming trends in a major way.
  • The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with activities above the Arctic Circle are rapidly expanding, except in the Russian sector. The Arctic continues to be getting warmer, and environmental change research in the region continues to expand. At the same time, as social problems don’t seem to go away, particularly among the indigenous groups, NGO activity expands and media coverage increases.
  • Automation technologies and more data will be good for jobs, economic development, and better environmental management. Digital data about the Arctic is expanding very quickly because of increased human activities in the area for environmental, navigation, and economic purposes and the deployment of drones and commercial sensing satellites with large data collection capacities. The Arctic is one location where new automation capabilities and vast quantities of more data will lead to economic growth and job increases.
  • A large luxury cruise ship, the Crystal Serenity, will traverse the Northwest Passage for the first time in August 2016. The trip could be a turning point for Arctic tourism in Canada. Iceland, Greenland, and Norway already promote Arctic tourism. Some NGOs and insurance companies are concerned about the safety and environmental risks.
  • However, Arctic sea routes won’t become major shipping lanes for many years, if ever. It is clear the routes won’t reliably ice free during the summer and late fall for many years, if ever. Shipping traffic on the more navigable Northern Sea Route (NSR) along the Russia coastline has fallen significantly since the high point of 70 ships in 2013. The likely biggest use of the routes will be the movement of Arctic resources (like Russian LNG) to growing Asian markets.
  • Russia continues to develop key infrastructure in the far north. Russia just announced construction beginning in 2017 of another 170 km of rail across the Yamal Peninsula to support the development of natural gas reserves and a new port in the area. President Putin highlighted the railway in his 2016 annual press conference. Russia also just launched in June 2016 its largest and most powerful nuclear-powered icebreaker, the Arktika, for the Arctic. Russia now has six reactor-driven ships for the Arctic; the United States has none. Finally, Russia announced the first of its kind floating nuclear power station has started tests in advance of its deployment in October 2017 in the Arctic.
  • Ship transport of Russian Barents Sea oil along the Norwegian Arctic coast in the first part of 2016 reached new highs because of cumulative oil-development and port infrastructure investments over the last decade in the Russian sector above the Arctic Circle. While US Energy Information Administration in its 2016-published energy outlook shows oil production from Alaska decreasing to less than half its current level after 2030.
  • Russia’s US$27 billion Yamal LNG project within the Arctic Circle will begin operation in 2017. This remarkable project will use West-designed and Far East-built ice-class LNG tankers to enable year-round export shipments from northwest Siberia to European and Asian markets. The LNG tankers are intended for navigation both westbound and eastbound along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the Arctic seaway along Russia’s coast linking the Atlantic and Pacific. The Russian company, Novatek, has a 50.1% interest in Yamal LNG; China National Petroleum Corporation and France’s Total Group both have a 20% holding; and the Chinese state-owned Silk Road Fund has a 9.1% interest.
  • Russia threatened by NATO in the Arctic. In Vladimir Putin’s July 2016 visit to Finland, he strongly advised the country to stay out of NATO. Both Sweden and Finland are increasing their military cooperation with NATO countries and having debates about joining the organization. The Russian Defense Ministry recently announced the deployment in 2017 of its Podsolnukh beyond-the-horizon radar system in the Arctic. In June 2016 a new law in Russia, aimed at strengthening security along the NSR, gave the Federal Security Service (FSB) responsibility for law enforcement along the Russian Arctic shipping passage. Before, law enforcement responsibilities in the area were distributed among the courts and various government agencies.
  • Sanctions by Western countries against Russia are also impacting Russia’s future development plans for the Arctic region. Russia’s economic development and business ambitions for the Arctic region call for more large investments in oil and gas and civil infrastructure that need international financial and technical support. Sanctions by Western countries, including Norway, Russia’s northwestern neighbor and a non-member of the EU have stopped most Arctic plans from moving forward. The remaining large project with Western capital involvement that was initiated several years ago is Yamal LNG, where the French energy company Total holds a 20 percent stake. Finland was a key supplier to Russia’s building nuclear icebreakers, but the ship equipment orders from Russia have stopped.
  • Despite the sanctions, on some multilateral Arctic matters cooperation with Russia has continued. From 2014 to 2016, a polar code for maritime activity was adopted, an agreement on fishing in the Arctic among the Arctic nations was signed; and an Arctic Coast Guard Forum was started.
  • But on other matters and at the bilateral level, cooperation with Russia has broken down. Russia is restricting Russian NGOs and international NGOs operating in Russia. Russia recently blocked the EU obtaining Arctic Council observer status. Russia recently refused permissions for Norwegian scientists to conduct research in Russia’s Arctic areas, while Norway suspended military to military cooperation with Russia.
  • In contrast to Russia’s commitment to the Arctic, the United States and Canada do not have grand ambitions for economic development in the area; instead they are largely trying to constrain the economic opportunities. At a recent summit between President Obama and Prime Minister Trudeau, they issued a statement pledging to develop low-impact shipping corridors, work toward a ban on all commercial fishing in the Arctic until research can determine sustainable levels, and protect 17 percent of land areas and 10 percent of marine areas by 2020. In April 2015, the United States assumed chairmanship of the Arctic Council for a two-year term and outlined the three priorities of its term: improving economic and living conditions for Arctic communities; Arctic Ocean safety, security, and stewardship; and addressing the impacts of climate change. Neither the United States nor Canada is expanding its navigation and infrastructure investments, including building any new icebreakers. The US Coast Guard has a total of two operational (old) icebreakers compared to Russia’s fleet of approximately forty. China—a nation without any territory above the Arctic Circle just commissioned its second icebreaker.
  • Since Russia’s incursions in Crimea and Ukraine, Norway has assumed a more confrontational approach to Russia’s aggressive behavior in the Arctic. The Norwegian government also recently announced plans to modernize the country’s armed forces and increase its military capital spending. Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg was quoted as saying, “we have an increasingly unpredictable neighbor to the east which is strengthening its military capacity and showing willingness to use military force as a political tool.” Norway’s recent award of a new exploration license to Statoil in disputed waters of the Barents Sea around Svalbard also upset Russia, which claims equal access to resources in the “Svalbard Box,” an area around the archipelago. The Svalbard Act of 1925 gives the Kingdom of Norway full and absolute sovereignty over Svalbard, but provides other countries that signed the treaty with economic rights on Svalbard.
  • As the technological and operational leader in the Arctic region, the partially state-owned Norwegian oil company, Statoil, continues to pursue opportunities throughout the region, including in Russia despite the strained political ties between Russia and Norway and the EU. Statoil’s strategic cooperation with Rosneft involves joint exploration in the Russian Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, as well as pursuing interests in a license in the Norwegian Barents Sea. Statoil plans to drill two wells in the Sea of Okhotsk in the far east of Russia in the summer of 2016. “We are pleased to have entered a key stage in our long term cooperation with our partner, Statoil . . .,” said Igor Sechin, chief executive of Rosneft and an ally of Russian president Vladimir Putin in July 2016. On the other hand, Norway and Statoil would like to continue selling natural gas extracted from Norwegian waters to Europe. But replacing the aging gas fields in Norway has been difficult, and Statoil and other energy companies haven’t yet made the next big discovery in Norwegian waters that would justify building the large necessary gas export infrastructure.
  • China’s support to Russian energy and infrastructure projects in the Arctic is critical but fragile. Russia desperately needs capital for expensive development projects in the Arctic abandoned by western firms due to the sanctions, and China has stepped up to help. For example, the Yamal LNG project and Chinese lenders recently signed a $12 billion loan agreement after two years of talks. But many other agreements signed in the last two years haven’t yet led to firm contracts, and the perception is China has been able to take advantage of Russia’s weak negotiating position. Also, China’s goal of building land and sea routes that will enable Europe to connect more easily with China will effectively reduce Russia’s role as a key trading partner of Europe.

Plausible Developments in the Next Five Years

The signals of change above suggest a number of possible developments and outcomes in the next five years that could affect the well-being of people, organizations, countries, and the environment. For any issue, the possible developments and outcomes in the future could vary significantly given the ranges of uncertainty of the major forces involved. The developments and outcomes listed below are those that could severely impact the people, organizations, governments, and countries engaged in the Arctic.

  • United States and Canada policy positions toward the Arctic
    • US and Canadian priorities for the Arctic are unlikely to change. The focus will be on protecting the environment and limiting exploitation of natural resources.
    • Infrastructure investments are unlikely to increase even though economic activity could expand if the climate continues to get warmer.
    • No new icebreaker for Canada or the United States will be built and deployed in the foreseeable future.
  • Indigenous populations
    • Indigenous groups will continue to receive widespread social services, healthcare, and educational aid.
    • Interesting experiments for using new automation technology to deliver that aid will be implemented.
    • Better outcomes for the groups won’t be achieved in the next five years; most indices in fact will likely continue to remain low.
  • Maritime activity
    • Luxury cruises through Arctic waters will be a major success.
    • But Arctic sea routes won’t become major shipping lanes in the next five years. It is clear the routes won’t be reliably ice free during the summer and late fall for many years, if ever.
    • However, transport of commodities extracted above the Arctic Circle, principally in Russian territory, to Asia along the NSR could become regular.
  • Oil and gas and mining ventures
    • Oil and gas prices won’t rise much beyond current levels ($45/barrel to $65/barrel oil) in the next five years.
    • International oil companies will renew efforts in all countries to find and develop new large oil and gas fields in the Arctic. But except in Norway and Russia, no new exploration will begin.
    • New mining ventures in Greenland, Canada, and Russia will become attractive again.
    • Chinese companies will continue to be major players in the new mining ventures and in Russian oil and gas.
  • Russia
    • Russia will continue to push development of its Arctic territory, build the civil and security infrastructure to support expansion of Russia’s economic activity in the region, and exert Russia’s effective security control over the international navigable waters.
    • Russia could respond with physical action to any further NATO encroachment in the area, including Finland or Sweden joining NATO, deployment of non-Norwegian forces in Norway, etc.
    • Russia may demand different terms for the control and administration of Svalbard and its surrounding waters. Russia will not likely accept Norway’s licensing of disputed oil and gas licenses in waters surrounding Svalbard.
    • As long as the sanctions remain in place, Russia could limit non-Russian trade shipments between Asia and European along the NSR.
  • Norway
    • Like Russia, Norway will continue encouraging development of its northern region. The Arctic region with its social and civil infrastructure needs will receive budget priority.
    • Norway will continue to promote oil and gas development in the Norwegian Barents Sea.
    • Norway will likely expand its security capabilities above the Arctic Circle to remain NATO’s northern leader and limit the coast guard assistance required from Russia.
    • Norway recognizes NATO likely won’t confront Russia over Arctic incursions not involving the mainland. Norway will attempt to mend its political fence with Russia, and seek opportunities for civic and business collaboration.
  • China, South Korea, Japan, India and Russia cooperation
    • Because of western sanctions, Russia will continue focusing on developing Asian nations as trading partners and financiers. The Arctic region will provide multiple opportunities for developing long-term economic relationships.
    • LNG transport from Russia’s Arctic region to Asian countries using the Arctic sea route, NSR, along Russia’s coast could open up the route to other shipments of mined commodities from Greenland, Norway, and Russia to Asia.
    • But Russia will only be moderately successful in attracting investment monies and knowhow from China and other countries that do not support the sanctions. For the non-Arctic states of Asia—China, South Korea, India, and Singapore— the Arctic is not strategic and their long-term commitment to the region is iffy.
  • Environmental research and insights
    • Increased Arctic activity by NGOs will lead to confrontations over oil and gas developments in Arctic waters and with Russian authorities over almost every maritime operation they have in Arctic waters.
    • Confrontations will also increase related to other mineral developments and a host of social, environmental, and business issues.
    • Large increases in the environmental data gathered about the Arctic region will occur because of advances in automation technology, easier access to the area because of warmer temperatures, and more economic assets deployed in the Arctic.
    • The cost of acquiring all this new data and analyzing it will dramatically increase. Major budget fights over Arctic priorities—wellbeing of indigenous populations, new civil infrastructure, security, or more environmental information gathering—likely occur.